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	Abstract		
Previous	research	suggests	impaired	metacognitive	monitoring	and	mathematics	under-
achievement	in	autism	spectrum	disorder	(ASD).	Within	educational	settings,	metacognitive	
monitoring	is	supported	through	the	provision	of	feedback,	(e.g.,	with	goal	reminders	and	by	
explicitly	correcting	errors).	Given	the	strength	of	the	relationship	between	metacognition,	learning	
and	educational	attainment,	the	current	research	tested	new	computer-based	metacognitive	
support	(the	‘Maths	Challenge’)	for	mathematics	leaners	with	ASD	within	the	context	of	their	
classroom.	The	Maths	Challenge	required	learners	to	engage	in	metacognitive	monitoring	before	
and	after	answering	each	question	(e.g.,	intentions	and	judgments	of	accuracy),	and	negotiate	with	
the	system	the	level	of	difficulty.	Forty	secondary	school	children	with	ASD	and	95	typically	
developing	learners	completed	the	Maths	Challenge	in	either	a	Feedback	condition,	with	
metacognitive	monitoring	support	regarding	the	accuracy	of	their	answers,	goal	reminders	and	
strategy	support,	or	with	no	feedback.	Contrary	to	previous	findings	ASD	learners	showed	an	
undiminished	ability	to	detect	errors.	They	did,	however,	demonstrate	reduced	cohesion	between	
their	pre-	and	post-test	intentions.	Support	from	the	Feedback	condition	significantly	improved	task	
performance	for	both	groups.	Findings	highlight	important	implications	for	educational	interventions	
regarding	the	provision	of	metacognitive	support	for	ASD	learners	to	ameliorate	under-performance	
in	mathematics	within	the	classroom.	 	
Supporting	metacognitive	monitoring	in	mathematics	learning	for	young	people	with	autism	
spectrum	disorder:	A	classroom-based	study	
	
Autism	spectrum	disorder	(ASD)	is	characterised	by	impairments	in	social	communication	
and	behavioural	flexibility	and	is	estimated	to	affect	around	1%	of	the	population	(American	
Psychiatric	Association,	2013;	Baird	et	al.,	2006).	These	impairments	may	impact	upon	learning,	and	
recent	reports	indicate	greater	gaps	in	attainment	for	pupils	with	ASD	compared	to	their	typically	
developing	(TD)	peers	(Keen,	Webster	&	Ridley,	2016;	Wilkinson	&	Twist,	2010),	with	many	
demonstrating	a	specific	deficit	in	mathematics	(e.g.,	Chiang	&	Lin,	2006;	Mayes	&	Calhoun,	2006).	
Despite	reports	of	the	existence	of	a	small	sub-group	of	mathematically	gifted	people	with	ASD	
(Aagten-Murphy	et	al.,	2015;	Chiang	&	Lin,	2006;	Iuculano	et	al.,	2014;	Jones	et	al.,	2009;	Mayes	&	
Calhoun,	2003;	2006),	on	average,	mathematics	ability	is	substantially	lower	among	people	with	ASD	
than	would	be	expected	on	the	basis	of	IQ	(Aagten-Murphy	et	al.,	2015;	Chiang	&	Lin,	2007;	Estes,	
Rivera,	Bryan,	Cali	&	Dawson,	2011;	Griswold	et	al.,	2002;	Mayes	&	Calhoun,	2003;	2006;	see	also	
Jones	et	al.,	2009).	Educational	underachievement	in	mathematics	contributes	directly	to	less-than-
optimal	economic	outcomes	(e.g.,	low	levels	of	employment)	and	life	chances	among	people	with	
ASD	(Estes	et	al.,	2011).	
One	of	the	most	effective	and	cost	efficient	educational	interventions	is	to	support	
metacognition	(Higgins	et	al.,	2013).	Metacognition	can	be	defined	as	the	ability	to	reflect	upon,	
understand	and	control	one’s	learning,	or	‘thinking	about	one’s	thinking’	(Schraw	&	Dennison,	1994).	
It	is	well	established	that	metacognition	facilitates	self-regulation	of	behaviour	and	learning:	
monitoring	when	or	where	mistakes	are	made	means	that	learning	strategies	can	be	modified	
accordingly	(e.g.,	revising	until	you	are	confident	you	know	the	topic).	Within	an	educational	
context,	research	has	highlighted	that	metacognition	predicts	academic	achievement	more	
powerfully	than	intellectual	abilities	(Hartwig,	Was,	Isaacson	&	Dunlosky,	2012;	Thiede,	1999;	
Veenman,	Kok	&	Blöte,	2005)	and	there	is	extensive	evidence	that	developing	metacognition	is	an	
effective	intervention	in	school	children	within	and	below	the	‘normal’	range	of	ability	(Dunlosky,	
Kubat-Silman	&	Hertzog,	2003;	Iuculano	et	al.,	2014;	Maxwell	&	Grenier,	2014;	Schneider	&	Artelt,	
2010;	van	der	Stel	&	Veenman,	2010;	see	also	Roebers,	Cimeli,	Röthlisberger	&	Neuenschwander,	
2012;	Roebers,	Krebs	&	Roderer,	2014).	Accordingly,	teaching	approaches	that	encourage	learners	to	
monitor,	evaluate	and	strategize	their	learning	are	now	widely	recommended	(Higgins	et	al.,	2013;	
Special	Education	Support	Service,	2009).		
This	is	pertinent	because	research	indicates	that	autistic	individuals	have	a	metacognitive	
deficit	(Bebko	&	Ricciuti,	2000;	Brosnan	et	al.,	2015;	Farrant,	Blades	&	Boucher,	1999;	Farrant,	
Boucher	&	Blades,	1999;	Grainger,	Williams	&	Lind,	2014,	2016;	McMahan	et	al.,	2016;	Vlamings	et	
al.,	2008;	Wojcik,	Moulin	&	Souchay,	2013).	For	example,	children	with	ASD	have	specific	
metacognitive	difficulties	in	identifying	when	they	have	made	mistakes	–	they	report	more	
confidence	in	the	accuracy	of	their	answers,	even	when	they	are	incorrect	(Brosnan	et	al.,	2015).	
This	is	striking	because	metacognitive	monitoring	relates	to	self-regulation	of	learning	(e.g.	Isaacson	
&	Fujita,	2006)	and	a	deficit	in	metacognitive	monitoring	could	explain	why	children	with	ASD	have	
difficulties	with	self-regulation	of	learning-related	behaviour;	not	knowing	what	you	know	and	what	
you	do	not	know,	or	not	knowing	if	a	mistake	has	been	made	severely	impairs	options	for	
responding	and	adapting	behaviour	accordingly.		
Brosnan	et	al.	(2015)	found	that,	as	well	as	being	more	likely	to	think	an	erroneous	answer	
was	correct,	when	told	they	had	made	an	error	learners	with	ASD	were	significantly	more	likely	to	
report	that	they	had	meant	to	make	that	error.	This	impaired	intention	monitoring	in	ASD	has	also	
been	found	outside	of	the	educational	context	in	other	types	of	tasks	such	as	knee	reflex	reactions	
(Williams	&	Happé,	2010)	and	matching	goals	with	desirable	but	unintended	outcomes	(Phillips,	
Baron-Cohen	&	Rutter,	1998).	Although	Brosnan	et	al.	suggested	their	finding	that	ASD	learners	
reported	they	meant	to	get	a	question	wrong	was	an	intention	monitoring	error,	there	was	no	
assessment	of	intention	prior	to	answering	the	mathematics	questions.	It	is	possible	therefore	that	
some	learners	did	in	fact	intend	to	get	the	answer	wrong	(thus	when	they	report	this	after	the	event,	
this	was	not	an	intention	monitoring	error).	
Research	with	TD	children	shows	that	learning	can	be	improved	with	the	provision	of	
immediate	formative	feedback	that	clarifies	goals	and	minimises	uncertainty	in	relation	to	how	well	
learners	are	performing	on	a	task,	and	what	strategies	they	could	take	to	achieve	their	goals	
(Azevedo	&	Bernard,	1995;	Bangert-Drowns,	Kulik,	Kulik	&	Morgan,	1991;	Shute,	2008).	
Metacognitive	self-regulation	training	in	planning,	monitoring	and	control	is	also	successful	in	
improving	mathematics	learning	with	both	TD	pupils	(Desoete	&	Veenman,	2006)	as	well	as	those	
with	learning	difficulties	(Cornoldi,	Lucangeli,	Caponi,	Falco,	Focchiatti	&	Todeschini,	1995;	
Kroesbergen	&	Van	Luit,	2003).	Such	training	has	been	shown	to	be	particularly	successful	when	
combined	with	cognitive	and	motivational	strategies	(Dignath	et	al.,	2008)	and	when	implemented	
via	the	use	of	a	computer	in	a	cognitive	apprenticeship-style	learning	environment	(Teong,	2003;	Xin	
&	Jitendra,	1999;	Zimmerman	&	Tsikalas,	2005).	Although	there	is	some	evidence	that	interventions	
such	as	reinforcements	for	successful	task	completions	can	support	ASD	learning	(e.g.,	Adcock	&	
Cuvo,	2009;	Charlop,	Kurtz	&	Milstein,	1992;	Chong	&	Carrr,	2005;	Dunlap	&	Koegel,	1980),	no	
research	has	specifically	targeted	support	for	metacognition	and	self-regulated	learning	in	ASD.	The	
provision	of	appropriate	metacognitive	support	for	learners	with	ASD	needs	to	be	informed	by	
where	their	difficulties	lie	specifically	with	respect	to	metacognitive	monitoring.		
The	current	research	therefore	examined:	1)	the	nature	of	the	metacognitive	difficulties	in	
ASD	with	respect	to	monitoring	the	accuracy	of	answers,	intentions,	and	regulating	learning	strategy	
accordingly;	and	2)	the	use	of	feedback	as	metacognitive	monitoring	support	in	mathematics	
learners	with	ASD.	Intentions	to	obtain	a	correct	answer	were	assessed	before	as	well	as	after	each	
question	was	attempted.	In	addition,	learners	were	able	to	adjust	the	level	of	difficulty	at	various	
points	throughout	the	program.	Mathematics	performance	was	explored	under	two	conditions	–	
one	condition	provided	metacognitive	monitoring	support	through	feedback	and	one	did	not.	We	
predicted	that	the	provision	of	metacognitive	monitoring	support	would	enhance	strategy	regulation	
(appropriately	adjusting	the	level	of	difficulty),	and	thus	mathematics	performance	(to	obtain	more	
points)	of	learners	with	ASD	who	have	a	deficit	in	metacognitive	monitoring.		
Different	types	of	learning	environments	in	and	outside	classrooms	impact	upon	self-
regulation	in	learners	and	research	should	be	sensitive	to	this	context	(Boekaerts	&	Corno,	2005).	
Despite	the	many	benefits	of	tightly-controlled	laboratory-based	research,	such	a	paradigm	can	
impact	upon	the	participant’s	perceived	value	of	the	task,	and	consequently	the	variables	under	
investigation.	Within	the	classroom,	intrinsic	value	is	strongly	related	to	use	of	cognitive	strategies	
and	self-regulation	by	typically	developing	learners.	For	example,	Pintrich	and	de	Groot	(1990)	
report	that	learners	who	are	cognitively	engaged	and	self-regulating	are	those	who	are	interested	in	
and	value	their	classroom	academic	work.	It	was	therefore	felt	crucial	to	examine	metacognition	and	
self-regulation	within	the	context	of	the	classroom,	specifically	a	typical	mathematics	lesson,	while	
acknowledging	that	this	will	limit	the	extent	to	which	ASD	and	TD	learners	can	be	considered	
matched.	Whether	and	how	to	match	is	an	ongoing	issue	in	ASD	research	(e.g.,	Barbeau,	Soulières,	
Dawson,	Zeffiro	&	Mottron,	2013;	Jarrold	&	Brock,	2004).	Importantly,	the	literature	above	suggests	
that	those	with	ASD	will	have	impaired	mathematical	ability	and	metacognition	and	therefore	
matching	on	these	(for	example	with	a	learning	disabilities	group	-	who	may	also	have	impaired	
language)	is	problematic.	Matching	mathematics	ability	with	younger	learners	can	also	be	
problematic	as	the	metacognitive	factors	under	investigation	do	not	predict	ability	until	around	11	
years	of	age	(Roebers	et	al.,	2014)	and	learners	with	ASD	can	make	types	of	mathematics	errors	that	
are	not	evidenced	in	TD	learners	(and	vice	versa;	Brosnan	et	al.,	2015).	In	an	attempt	to	address	
these	issues,	the	present	study’s	methodology	presented	mathematics	questions	at	the	appropriate	
level	for	each	student	individually	in	the	context	of	their	classroom-based	mathematics	lesson	
through	a	computer-based	‘Maths	Challenge’	(described	below).	
	
		
Method	
Participants	and	design	
Forty	secondary	school	children	(30	male,	10	female)	who	had	received	a	formal	diagnosis	of	
autism	or	Asperger	syndrome	by	a	qualified	clinician	according	to	DSM	(American	Psychiatric	
Association,	2000,	2013)	or	ICD	criteria	(World	Health	Organisation,	1993)	were	recruited	from	
schools	or	units	specifically	for	children	with	ASD.	Secondary	School	in	England	covers	ages	11-16	
where	the	curriculum	is	divided	between	Key	Stage	3	(ages	11-14)	and	Key	Stage	4	(ages	15-16).	
Under-achieving	children	may	still	be	working	at	Key	Stage	2	(for	ages	7-11)	or	even	Key	Stage	1	(for	
ages	5-7)1.	The	mean	age	of	the	ASD	group	was	13.33	years	(SD	=	1.25,	range	=	11-16	years),	and	the	
majority	were	working	below	the	expected	level,	at	Key	Stages	1	(n	=	10;	mean	age	=	12.70	years)	or	
2	(n	=	20;	mean	age	=	13.35	years)2,	however	4	ASD	pupils	were	working	at	Key	Stage	3	(mean	age	=	
13.50	years)	and	6	were	working	at	Key	Stage	4	(mean	age	=	14.17	years).	All	children	with	ASD	were	
educated	within	specialist	provision	classrooms	housed	within	mainstream	schools.	Comparison	
participants	comprised	95	secondary	school	pupils	(58	male,	37	female)	from	mainstream	schools,	
with	a	mean	age	of	13.40	years	(SD	=	1.15,	range	=	11-15	years),	and	all	were	working	at	the	
appropriate	level,	at	Key	Stages	3	(n	=	64,	mean	age	=	12.88	years)	and	4	(n	=	31,	mean	age	=	14.48	
years).	Ethical	approval	was	prospectively	obtained	from	the	University	of	Bath	research	ethics	
committee.		
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	groups	did	not	significantly	differ	on	age,	t(133)	=.34,	p	=.74,	
d	=	.06,	or	proportion	of	males	to	females,	χ2	=	2.41	(1,	N=135),	p	=	.12,	ϕ	=	.13,	and	the	ASD	group	
was	under-achieving	in	mathematics	as	has	widely	been	reported	in	the	literature	(e.g.,	Aagten-
Murphy	et	al.,	2015;	Chiang	&	Lin,	2007;	Estes	et	al.,	2011;	Griswold	et	al.,	2002).	The	samples	were	
therefore	reflective	of	the	populations	from	which	they	were	drawn.	The	focus	of	the	present	study	
was	not	on	absolute	level	of	mathematical	ability	–	as	the	computer	program	was	flexible	to	start	at	
the	appropriate	level	for	each	student	(Key	Stage	1	to	4)	–	but	on	the	influence	of	feedback	on	
metacognition	(see	Discussion).	The	study	took	place	within	the	context	of	the	classroom	and	
assessments	of	mathematical	ability	were	from	the	classroom	teacher	and	starting	level	
mathematics	performance	on	the	current	task,	as	formal	assessments	of	mathematical	ability	were	
not	possible	within	this	context.	
																																								 																				
1	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-curriculum-in-england-
mathematics-programmes-of-study	
	
A	2	(Group:	ASD	vs.	TD)	x	2	(Metacognitive	support:	Feedback	vs.	No	feedback)	between	
participants	design	was	used,	whereby	participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	either	a	‘Feedback’	
or	a	‘No	Feedback’	condition	(see	below	for	more	details),	with	the	constraint	that	there	were	
approximately	the	same	number	of	participants	in	each	group	x	condition	cell.	The	final	sample	
comprised	40	ASD	participants	(21	feedback;	19	no	feedback)	and	95	TD	participants	(46	feedback;	
49	no	feedback).	There	was	an	even	distribution	in	the	ratio	of	males	to	females	in	each	feedback	
condition	for	both	the	ASD	(p	=	.57, ϕ	=	.03,	Fishers	exact	test)	and	TD	group	(χ2	(1,	N	=	95)	=	.21,	p	=	
.65,	ϕ	=	.05),	and	age	was	evenly	distributed	between	conditions	for	both	ASD,	F(1,	38)	=	.04,	p	=	.84,	
ηp²	=	.001,	and	TD	groups,	F(1,	93)	=	.18,	p	=	.67,	ηp²	=	.002.	There	was	an	approximately	even	
distribution	of	participants	working	at	the	different	Key	Stages	between	conditions	for	both	the	ASD	
(p	=.51, ϕ	=	.26,	Fishers	exact	test)	and	the	TD	group	(χ2	(1,	N	=95)	<.001,	p	>.99, ϕ	=	<.001)	(Table	1).	
Finally,	while	starting	level	mathematics	performance,	in	terms	of	number	of	correct	answers	
provided	for	the	first	block	of	questions	(that	is,	independent	from	metacognitive	ability	and	
feedback	condition),	was	significantly	lower	among	ASD	participants	compared	to	the	TD	group,	
F(1,131)	=	9.90,	p	=	.002,	ηp²	=.07,	it	did	not	differ	between	feedback	conditions,	F(1,	131)	=	1.02,	p	=	
.32,	ηp²	=	.01.	A	lack	of	Group	x	Condition	interaction	indicated	that	starting	level	mathematics	did	
not	significantly	differ	between	feedback	conditions	for	either	group,	F(1,	131)	=	1.17,	p	=	.28,	ηp²	=	
.01.	Thus,	we	were	confident	that	age,	sex	and	mathematically	ability	did	not	significantly	differ	
between	the	Feedback	and	No	Feedback	conditions.	
	
Table	1.	Distribution	of	participants,	mean	ages	and	ratio	of	males	to	females	working	between	the	
different	Key	Stages	in	each	condition		
	 	 	 ASD	 TD	
	 	 Key	
Stage	
1	
Key	
Stage	
2	
Key	
Stage	
3	
Key	
Stage	
4	
Key	
Stage	
1	
Key	
Stage	
2	
Key	
Stage	
3	
Key	
Stage	
4	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Feedback		 %	(n)	 15%	
(6)	
30%	
(12)	
2.5%	
(1)	
5%	(2)	 0	 0	 33%	
(31)	
16%	
(15)	
	 M	age	(SD)	
	
12.83	
(.41)	
13.25	
(1.22)	
14.00		
(	-	)	
14.50	
(.71)	
	 	 12.84	
(.93)	
14.40	
(.63)	
	 N	male;	
female	
5;	1	 8;	4	 1;	0		 2;	0		 	 	 17;	14	 10;	5	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
No	
Feedback	
%	(n)	 10%	
(4)	
20%	
(8)	
7.5%	
(3)	
10%	
(4)	
0	 0	 35%	
(33)	
17%	
(16)	
M	age	(SD)	
	
12.50	
(1.29)	
13.50	
(1.93)	
13.33	
(1.15)	
14.00	
(.00)	
	 	 12.91	
(1.01)	
14.56	
(.63)	
N	male;	
female	
3;	1	 5;	3	 2;	1	 4;	0	 	 	 21;	12	 10;	6	
		
Materials	and	procedure	
The	Maths	Challenge.	We	developed	the	“Maths	Challenge”	computer	program	in	Real	
Studio	(Xojo,	2011),	whereby,	to	maximise	points	won,	participants	needed	to	monitor	their	
performance	and	adapt	their	strategy	accordingly.	The	program	comprised	seven	levels	of	difficulty	
and	questions	were	more	difficult	the	higher	the	level.	Each	question	answered	correctly	was	worth	
points	commensurate	to	that	level	(e.g.,	3	points	per	question	answered	correctly	on	Level	3),	while	
errors	were	worth	0	points.	Participants	answered	four	blocks	of	three	questions.	In	order	to	provide	
participants	the	opportunity	to	move	up	or	down	in	level	of	difficulty	from	the	outset	(after	
completing	the	first	block),	all	participants	started	the	game	at	Level	4.	After	completing	each	block,	
participants	decided	themselves	whether	to	stay	at	the	same	level	(with	the	same	points	available	
per	question),	move	up	a	level	(with	more	points	available	per	question)	or	move	down	a	level	for	
the	next	block	(with	fewer	points	available	per	question)	and	so	forth	until	they	had	completed	all	
four	blocks.	Thus,	notwithstanding	mathematics	ability,	an	individual’s	maximum	points	potential	
was	determined	by	their	metacognitive	strategy	regulation	(e.g.,	if	all	questions	on	Level	4	were	
answered	incorrectly	the	most	rewarding	strategy	would	be	to	move	down	to	Level	3	for	the	next	
block),	as	well	as	their	ability	to	judge	when	errors	are	made.		
Four	versions	of	the	Maths	Challenge	were	developed	to	accommodate	pupils	at	varying	
levels	of	mathematical	ability	in	terms	of	the	English	Key	Stage	(KS)	level	they	were	currently	
working	at.	Specifically,	Version	1	comprised	questions	from	KS1;	Version	2	questions	from	KS2;	
Version	3	questions	from	KS3;	and	Version	4	questions	from	KS4.	Within	each	version,	Levels	1	to	7	
comprised	questions	from	lower	to	higher	KS	sub-levels	within	that	respective	Key	Stage.	
Mathematics	questions	were	selected	from	UK	National	Curriculum	past	test	papers	and	exam	
revision	workbooks	on	the	basis	that	they	could	be	answered	mentally,	without	the	need	for	pen,	
paper	or	calculator.	The	program	began	with	general	instructions	explaining	the	structure,	aims	and	
points	allocations.	Each	mathematics	question	was	preceded	by	a	5-point	pre-test	intention	measure	
(“how	hard	are	you	going	to	try	to	get	the	next	question	right”),	and	was	followed	by	a	5-point	post-
test	metacognitive	monitoring	confidence	judgment	(“do	you	think	you	got	that	question	right	or	
wrong”),	and	finally	a	3-point	post-test	intention	measure	(“did	you	mean	to	get	that	question	right	
or	wrong”)	(Figure	1).	For	the	purposes	of	the	analyses,	the	5-point	pre-test	measure	was	collapsed	
into	3	points	(1	=	try	to	get	wrong;	2	=	neutral;	3	=	try	to	get	right).	A	prototype	of	the	program	was	
piloted	with	both	ASD	and	TD	children	and	received	positive	evaluations,	indicating	that	children	
were	motivated	to	perform	well.		
		
Figure	1.	Order	of	pre-	and	post-test	intention	and	metacognitive	judgment	measures	for	each	
mathematics	question	in	the	Feedback	condition.	Note	that	in	the	No	Feedback	condition	the	correct	
answer	(the	fourth	display	box)	was	omitted.		
	
Participants	were	tested	in	classroom	groups	during	school	lessons;	however,	each	pupil	
completed	the	program	individually	at	their	own	computer.	In	the	Feedback	condition,	participants	
received	feedback	after	each	question	regarding	whether	they	had	answered	correctly	or	not,	and	
how	many	points	they	had	won	for	that	question.	This	was	displayed	in	the	text	and	also	graphically	
with	gold	coins	denoting	the	points	won	for	that	question,	as	well	as	a	running	total	of	points	won	
thus	far	displayed	in	a	box	on	the	top	left	corner	of	the	screen.	After	completing	each	level,	
Feedback	participants	also	received	a	summary	regarding	the	number	of	questions	they	had	
answered	correctly	and	the	number	of	points	won,	which	was	accompanied	by	a	goal	reminder	that	
their	task	was	to	finish	the	program	with	as	many	points	as	possible.	After	completing	the	three	
questions	in	each	level,	all	participants	were	asked	whether	they	wanted	to	move	up,	down,	or	stay	
on	the	same	level.	In	the	feedback	condition,	this	was	accompanied	by	strategy	reminders;	for	
example	that	choosing	to	go	down	a	level	would	mean	easier	questions,	but	fewer	points	available	
for	each	question.	To	examine	metacognitive	monitoring	(of	mathematics	accuracy)	and	strategy	
regulation	(level	decisions	that	optimise	correct	answers	and	points	won)	in	the	absence	of	external	
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support,	the	No	Feedback	condition	provided	no	indication	of	whether	questions	had	been	
answered	correctly	or	not,	and	information	regarding	points	won	and	goal/strategy	reminders	were	
omitted	from	the	display	(Figure	2).		
	
	
Figure	2.	Provision	of	feedback,	goal	reminders	and	metacognitive	strategy	support	prior	to	level	
decisions	in	the	Feedback	condition	(panel	A).	In	the	No	Feedback	condition	participants	were	simply	
asked	to	make	a	level	decision	(panel	B).		
	
	
Finally,	participants	completed	a	brief	metacognitive	questionnaire,	comprising	four	
questions	(each	answered	on	a	4-point	scale)	reflecting	on	their	metacognitive	performance,	
specifically:	awareness	of	performance	(from	‘never	or	rarely	aware’	to	‘always	aware’);	points	plan	
(from	‘no	plan’	to	‘get	as	many	points	as	possible’);	level	strategy	(from	‘stayed	on	the	same	level	
regardless	of	difficulty’	to	‘if	easy	then	up;	if	difficult	then	down	a	level’);	checking	of	answers	(from	
‘never	or	rarely	checked’	to	‘always	checked	answers’).		
	
	
	
Results	
	Analysis	overview	
We	report	the	results	of	analyses	conducted	to	test	the	nature	of	the	metacognitive	
difficulties	in	ASD	(and	whether	experimental	task	performance	differed	between	groups	and	
feedback	conditions)	with	respect	to	the	following	metacognitive	variables:	Judgments	of	confidence	
for	correct	and	incorrect	answers;	pre-	and	post-question	intention	monitoring;	and	self-reported	
metacognition	ratings.	Finally,	we	report	the	effect	of	feedback	in	terms	of	the	number	of	correct	
answers	in	the	first	and	final	blocks.	Table	2	provides	a	summary	of	the	means	and	SDs	of	each	of	
these	variables	between	groups	and	conditions.		
	
Table	2.	Mean	scores	across	all	task	variables	(standard	deviations	are	in	parentheses)	
	
	 ASD	 TD	
	 No	Feedback	 Feedback	 No	Feedback	 Feedback	
Judgements	of	confidence	in	answers	
(range	=	0-1)	
.69	(.22)	 .76	(.25)	 .70	(.17)	 .67	(.25)	
Mean	pre-test	question	intentions	
(range	=	1-3)	
2.88	(.35)	 3.00	(.02)	 2.90	(.30)	 2.74	(.54)	
Mean	post-test	intentions	(range	=	1-
3)	
2.51	(.66)	 2.49	(.59)	 2.71	(.52)	 2.36	(.70)	
Self-reported	metacognition	score	
(range	=	0-12)	
4.53	(3.49)	 3.38	(3.17)	 4.55	(2.37)	 4.13	(3.57)	
Starting	level	Mathematics	
performance	(number	of	points	won	
on	first	block)	(range	=	0-12)	
5.26	(4.43)	 6.86	(4.76)	 8.49	(3.80)	 8.43	(3.79)	
Final	level	Mathematics	performance	
(number	of	points	won	on	final	block	
(range	=	0-21)	
3.21	(5.13)	 7.67	(6.69)	 6.29	(5.73)	 7.30	(5.27)	
	
	
Judgments	of	confidence		
Participants’	ordinal	metacognitive	judgment	ratings	of	their	accuracy	to	each	question	on	a	
5-point	confidence	scale	(‘I’m	sure	I	got	it	right’;	‘I	think	I	got	it	right’;	‘I	don't	know’;	‘I	think	I	got	it	
wrong’;	‘I’m	sure	I	got	it	wrong’)	were	translated	question-by-question	into	interval	data	(1,	0.75,	
0.5,	0.25,	0)	for	the	analyses.		
	To	determine	whether	participants	assigned	higher	confidence	to	correct	compared	to	
incorrect	answers,	a	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition:	Feedback	vs.	No	Feedback)	x	2	(Answer:	correct	vs.	
incorrect)	mixed-ANOVA	was	conducted,	where	Answer	was	the	within-participants	factor3.	There	
was	a	main	effect	of	Group,	F(1,	120)	=	4.15,	p	=	.04,	ηp²	=	.03,	whereby	the	ASD	group	were	
significantly	more	confident	generally	that	their	answers	were	correct	(M	=	.73,	SD	=	.23)	than	were	
the	TD	group	(M	=	.68,	SD	=	.21).	There	was	also	a	significant	main	effect	of	Answer,	F(1,	120)	=	
87.34,	p	<	.001,	ηp²	=	.42,	whereby	confidence	was	significantly	higher	for	correct	answers	(M	=	.80,	
SD	=	.18)	than	for	incorrect	answers	(M	=	.56,	SD	=	.27).	There	was	no	effect	of	Condition,	F(1,	120)	=	
.11,	p	=	.74,	ηp²	=	.001,	Group	x	Condition	interaction,	F(1,	120)	=	2.69,	p	=	.11,	ηp²	=.02,	or	Group	x	
Condition	x	Answer	interaction,	F(1,	120)	=	1.60,	p	=	.21,	ηp²	=.01,	indicating	that	the	provision	of	
feedback	did	not	affect	the	nature	of	metacognitive	judgements	among	either	group.	Finally,	the	
Group	x	Answer	interaction	was	not	significant,	F(1,	120)	=	.59,	p	=	.45,	ηp²	=	.005,	indicating	that	
both	groups	showed	higher	confidence	for	correct	than	incorrect	answers	(Figure	3).		
	
	
Figure	3.	Mean	confidence	in	correct	and	incorrect	answers	by	ASD	and	TD	participants	(error	bars	
indicate	the	95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	mean)	
 
	
Intention	monitoring	
Pre-test	intentions.	A	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition)	between	participants	ANOVA	revealed	no	
significant	main	effects	of	Group,	F(1,	131)	=	1.82,	p	=	.18,	ηp²	=	.01,	or	Condition,	F(1,	131)	=	1.23,	p	
=	.27,	ηp²	=	.01.	The	Group	x	Condition	interaction	for	pre-test	intentions	was	also	not	significant,	
F(1,	131)	=	.57,	p	=	.45,	ηp²	=	.004.		
																																								 																				
3	Four	TD	participants	and	two	ASD	participants	did	not	produce	any	correct	answers,	and	four	ASD	
participants	did	not	produce	any	incorrect	answers.	These	participants	were	excluded	from	the	analysis.	
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
ASD TD
M
ea
n	
co
nf
id
en
ce
	
Correct
Incorrect
Post-test	intentions.	A	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition)	between	participants	ANOVA	revealed	no	
significant	main	effects	of	Group,	F(1,	131)	=	.06,	p	=	.80,	ηp²	<	.01,	or	Condition,	F(1,	131)	=	2.56,	p	=	
.11,	ηp²	=	.02.	The	Group	x	Condition	interaction	for	pre-test	intentions	was	also	not	significant,	F(1,	
131)	=	2.06,	p	=	.15,	ηp²	=	.02.		
Predicting	post-test	intentions	from	pre-test	intentions.	Pre-	and	post-test	intentions	were	
significantly	positively	correlated	for	both	ASD,	r	=	.64,	p	<	.001,	and	TD	groups,	r	=	.81,	p	<	.001.	To	
examine	whether	the	strength	of	the	association	between	pre-	and	post-test	intentions	was	similar	
for	both	groups,	Fisher’s	Z	transformations	were	conducted.	These	indicated	a	significantly	weaker	
association	between	pre-	and	post-test	intentions	for	the	ASD	group	compared	to	the	TD	group,	Zr1	–	
r2	=	1.89,	p	=	.03.	Figure	4	displays	average	post-test	intentions	(from	1	=	‘I	meant	to	get	it	wrong’	to	
3	‘I	meant	to	get	it	right’)	for	each	pre-test	intention	option	(from	1	=	‘I’m	going	to	try	to	get	it	
wrong’	to	3	=	‘I’m	going	to	try	to	get	it	right’)	for	errors	made	by	ASD	and	TD	groups.	The	TD	group	
showed	better	calibration	(with	scores	closer	to	the	dotted	line)	than	the	ASD	group.	
	
	
	
Figure	4.	Pre-	and	post-test	intentions	for	errors.	The	dotted	line	indicates	perfect	calibration.		
	
Metacognitive	questionnaire		
A	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition)	MANOVA	was	conducted	with	participants’	four	self-reported	
metacognitive	ratings	(awareness	of	performance;	points	plan;	level	strategy	and	checking	of	
answers)	as	dependant	variables.	There	was	no	multivariate	effect	of	Group,	F(4,	128)	=	1.63,	p	=	.17,	
ηp²	=	.05,	or	Condition,	F(4,	128)	=	2.13,	p	=	.08,	ηp²	=	.06,	and	the	Group	x	Condition	interaction	was	
also	not	significant,	F(4,	128)	=	.61,	p	=	.66,	ηp²	=	.02.		
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Mathematics	performance:	Effect	of	feedback	
Groups	significantly	differed	on	starting	level	mathematics,	as	described	above	and	
evidenced	by	significantly	fewer	points	won	by	the	ASD	group	on	the	first	block	of	questions,	F(1,	
131)	=9.90,	p	=.002,	ηp²	=	.07,	with	no	main	effect	of	Condition	or	Group	x	Condition	interaction	at	
the	start	of	the	task	(ps	>.28).	To	examine	whether	feedback	was	effective	in	improving	self-
regulation,	as	measured	by	optimal	strategy	use	to	win	as	many	points	as	possible,	a	2	(Group)	x	2	
(Condition)	between	participants	ANOVA	was	conducted	for	points	won	on	the	final	block4.	There	
was	a	significant	effect	of	Condition,	F(1,	131)	=	6.57,	p	=	.01,	ηp²	=	.05,	whereby	more	points	were	
won	in	the	Feedback	(M	=	7.42,	SD	=	5.71)	compared	to	the	No	Feedback	condition	(M	=	5.43,	SD	=	
5.70)	but	no	significant	main	effect	of	Group,	F(1,	131)	=	1.61,	p	=	.21,	ηp²	=	.01	or	Group	x	Condition	
interaction,	F(1,	131)	=	2.59,	p	=	.11,	ηp²	=	.02.	Thus,	the	provision	of	feedback	improved	
performance	for	both	groups	(Figure	5).		
	
	 	
	
Figure	5.	Number	of	points	won	on	the	final	block	in	the	Maths	Challenge	as	a	function	of	Group	and	
Feedback	condition	(error	bars	indicate	the	95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	mean)	
	
	
																																								 																				
4	Since	ASD	and	TD	groups	differed	on	starting	level	mathematics	performance	(and	thus	the	number	of	points	
won	at	the	start	of	the	game),	strategy	would	be	expected	to	have	its	largest	effect	on	points	won	on	the	final	
block.	
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‘Metacognition’,	or	awareness	of	one’s	cognition,	makes	a	major	contribution	to	the	
learning	of	mathematics	and	is	a	better	predictor	of	educational	achievement	(e.g.,	exam	
performance)	than	assessments	of	intelligence.	Self-regulated	learning	requires	setting	one’s	own	
goals	in	relation	to	learning	and	ensuring	that	they	are	attained	(Efklides,	2011).	Effectively	
regulating	learning,	for	example	through	study	time	allocation	and	revision	methods,	is	dependent	
on	the	ability	to	monitor	what	and	how	much	material	is	known,	as	well	as	one’s	goals	and	
intentions	(Metcalfe,	2009;	Nelson	&	Narens,	1990).	Despite	the	metacognitive	difficulties	and	
educational	under	attainment	experienced	by	people	with	ASD,	no	research	has	specifically	targeted	
support	for	metacognition	and	self-regulated	learning	in	ASD.	The	context	of	self-regulated	learning	
has	been	argued	to	be	crucial,	requiring	research	to	be	as	context-sensitive	as	possible	(e.g.,	
Boekaerts	&	Corno,	2005);	thus,	the	aim	of	the	current	research	was	to	test	appropriate	
metacognitive	support	for	ASD	mathematics	learners	within	the	context	of	their	mathematics	
lessons.		
The	present	findings	indicate	that	ASD	leaners	can	successfully	distinguish	correct	from	
incorrect	answers.	This	is	contrary	to	previous	reports	that	autistic	children	show	diminished	
metacognitive	monitoring,	reporting	more	confidence	in	their	answers,	even	when	they	are	
incorrect	(e.g.,	Brosnan	et	al.,	2015;	Grainger	et	al.,	2016;	McMahon	et	al.,	2016;	Williams,	
Bergström	&	Grainger,	2017).	Findings	from	the	current	study	indicate	that	while	individuals	with	
ASD	showed	a	general	bias	toward	higher	confidence,	they	were	still	able	to	differentiate	correct	
from	incorrect	answers.	A	potential	explanation	for	the	current	diverging	findings	could	lie	with	the	
types	of	tasks	used,	with	the	present	study	adopting	a	non-socially	delivered	task	in	the	classroom	
context	with	elements	from	serious	gaming,	which	together	may	have	increased	ASD	learners’	
understanding,	engagement	and	intrinsic	motivation	in	the	task	(see	Kenworthy,	Yerys,	Anthony	&	
Wallace,	2008;	White,	Burgess	&	Hill,	2009;	Whyte,	Smyth	&	Schef,	2015).		
While	monitoring	the	accuracy	of	their	answers	appeared	undiminished,	learners	with	ASD	
nevertheless	showed	reduced	cohesion	between	their	pre-	and	post-test	intentions.	Including	a	
measure	of	pre-test	intentions	enabled	the	present	study	to	extend	previous	findings	by	Brosnan	et	
al.	(2015)	to	confirm	that	errors	made	on	mathematics	questions	were	not	intended,	and	therefore	
that	post-hoc	reporting	that	errors	had	been	intended	more	likely	reflects	diminished	intention	
monitoring.	This	is	important	as	a	diminished	sense	of	one’s	intentions	towards	a	task	could	have	a	
significant	impact	on	one’s	capacity	to	benefit	from	the	experience	of	attempting	the	task.	
Interestingly	there	were	no	differences	in	the	absolute	assessments	of	pre-	and	post-	intentions	to	
answer	questions	correctly;	the	group	difference	emerged	in	the	relationship	between	pre-	and	
post-	intentions,	thus	indicating	a	more	subtle	impairment	in	monitoring	one’s	own	intentions	in	
ASD.	
Learners	with	ASD	benefited	from	metacognitive	support,	as	evidenced	by	their	better	
performance	in	the	Feedback	compared	to	the	No	Feedback	condition.	Although	the	Group	x	
Condition	interaction	did	not	reach	statistical	significance,	this	feedback	support	appeared	to	be	less	
effective	for	the	TD	group	(Figure	5);	however	these	young	people	did	not	have	a	metacognitive	
deficit.	The	error	bars	in	Figure	5	highlight	the	variability	in	performance	and	the	need	for	caution	in	
interpreting	the	data,	but	with	no	feedback	the	ASD	group	average	around	half	the	number	of	points	
of	the	TD	group	and	slightly	more	points	than	the	TD	group	with	the	provision	of	feedback.	The	
provision	of	feedback,	goal	and	strategy	support	may	be	most	effective	for	learners	who	have	
difficulties	in	metacognitive	monitoring.		
Higgins	et	al.	(2013)	report	that	supporting	metacognition	is	a	fast,	efficient	and	low	cost	
method	for	supporting	learning.	Consistent	with	this,	the	present	research	suggests	that	for	learners	
with	diminished	metacognitive	monitoring,	metacognitive	support	should:	(i)	affirm	the	goal	(e.g.,	to	
get	the	answer	correct);	(ii)	feedback	immediately	(e.g.,	whether	the	answer	was	correct/incorrect);	
and	(iii)	reflect	on	the	goal	(e.g.,	intention	monitoring).	A	limitation	of	the	present	study	is	that	it	was	
not	possible	to	disentangle	the	relative	benefits	of	each	of	these	components	of	metacognitive	
support	provided	by	the	feedback	condition.	This	is	especially	pertinent	in	the	context	of	the	present	
findings	of	an	intention	monitoring	deficit	alongside	undiminished	accuracy	monitoring.	For	
example,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	provision	of	feedback	about	performance	was	a	necessary	
component	in	supporting	task	performance,	or	whether	goal	reminders	alone	would	be	sufficient.	
Moreover,	although	successful	performance	on	the	Maths	Challenge	was	dependent	on	strategy	
regulation	(to	win	as	many	points	as	possible),	the	present	study	did	not	extricate	where	group	
differences	lay	in	metacognitive	strategy	regulation.	Further	analysis	of	participants’	self-selecting	of	
difficulty	level,	for	example,	may	reveal	differences	between	the	two	groups.	If	learners	with	ASD	are	
also	poorer	at	judging	when	to	best	shift	difficulty	levels,	despite	when	feedback	is	provided,	
implementing	Dynamic	Difficulty	Adjustment	(DDA)	(Hunicke,	2005),	where	game	difficulty	is	
modified	automatically	in	response	to	students’	answers,	may	be	beneficial.	Anderson	(2012)	
proposed	developing	a	framework	of	conceptual	knowledge	for	the	teaching	of	fractions	in	a	Digital	
Educational	Game,	where	the	game	keeps	track	of	players’	knowledge	and	adapts	the	difficulty	level	
accordingly.	Future	work	may	investigate	differences	in	performance	between	self-selecting	
difficulty	and	DDA,	and	whether	this	can	further	support	metacognition	in	ASD.	Finally,	the	level	of	
challenge	in	the	current	study	was	individualised,	which	may	be	significant	in	the	efficacy	of	support	
(e.g.,	not	too	easy/hard).	Future	research	should	tease	apart	these	aspects	in	order	to	more	
specifically	target	where	support	is	needed	in	terms	of	metacognitive	monitoring,	intentions	and	
self-regulation	respectively.	
	These	steps	to	support	learning	would	be	expected	to	extend	to	all	learners	with	deficits	in	
metacognitive	monitoring,	not	just	those	with	ASD,	although	this	needs	to	be	assessed	empirically.	
There	may	be	other	reasons	underpinning	poor	mathematical	performance,	such	as	developmental	
dyscalculia,	which	is	thought	to	be	a	deficit	in	a	basic	capacity	for	understanding	numerosity	(e.g.,	
Butterworth,	2004).	People	with	ASD	may	also	have	additional	deficits	in	numerosity	(e.g.,	Aagten-
Murphy	et	al.,	2015),	which	one	would	not	expect	to	be	ameliorated	though	interventions	
addressing	metacognition.	The	ASD	group	were	mostly	working	at	a	Key	Stage	level	below	where	
they	were	expected	to	be	working	(the	TD	group	were	not).	Thus,	whilst	the	ASD	group	were	found	
to	benefit	from	feedback,	this	does	not	necessitate	that	they	were	consequently	at	the	same	
academic	level	as	the	control	group.	Future	research	could	assess	both	mathematical	skills	and	
metacognitive	skills	to	establish	any	interrelationships.	We	would	expect	that	supporting	
metacognitive	monitoring	would	be	the	first	step	in	addressing	numerosity	deficits.	It	is	worth	
reiterating,	however,	that	whilst	people	with	ASD	typically	show	a	specific	impairment	in	
mathematical	ability	incommensurate	with	their	IQ,	there	is	also	a	small	group	of	mathematically	
gifted	people	with	ASD	(Aagten-Murphy	et	al.,	2015;	Chiang	&	Lin,	2006;	Iuculano	et	al.,	2014;	Jones	
et	al.,	2009;	Mayes	&	Calhoun,	2003;	2006).	The	present	finding	may	not	extend	to	such	a	group,	and	
it	would	be	interesting	to	identify	how	metacognition	and	numerosity	skills	differentiated	this	
mathematically	gifted	sub	group	from	the	typical	ASD	profile.	
Metacognitive	monitoring	is	considered	essential	for	a	sense	of	‘self-concept’	(Roebers	et	al.,	
2012)	and	for	day-to-day	behavioural	functioning,	because	accurate	monitoring	of	one’s	internal	
states	facilitates	the	regulation	of	and	control	over	those	states,	and	over	learning	and	behaviour	
(Nelson	&	Leonesio,	1988).	We	have	used	the	term	metacognitive	monitoring	to	encompass	
assessments	of	intention	before	and	after	each	task,	and	accuracy,	as	well	as	the	capacity	to	control	
appropriate	cognitive	responses	to	these	assessments.	This	process	has	been	distinguished	from	
metacognitive	knowledge	of	cognition,	which	is	the	stored	acquired	knowledge	of	cognition	(e.g.	‘I	
am	better	at	arithmetic	than	I	am	at	spelling’;	Flavell,	1979;	Lockl	&	Schneider,	2002;	Nelson	&	
Narens,	1990;	Schraw	&	Moshman,	1995).	Despite	differences	between	groups	in	intention	
monitoring,	there	were	no	self-reported	differences	on	the	metacognition	questionnaire.	If	we	
assume	that	the	intervention	did	effectively	target	metacognitive	monitoring,	it	may	be	that	those	
with	ASD	are	unable	to	self-report	their	own	metacognition.	This	is	consistent	with	Williams	and	
Happé	(2010)	who	argue	that	a	metacognitive	understanding	of	one’s	own	mind	may	be	more	
impaired	in	ASD	than	the	metacognitive	understanding	of	other	people’s	minds.	Indeed,	Grainger	et	
al.	(2014)	report	that	despite	behaviourally	demonstrating	impaired	metacognition	(compared	to	
controls),	people	with	ASD	self-reported	higher	levels	of	metacognition.		
It	is	a	limitation	of	the	present	study	that	that	we	did	not	undertake	an	independent	
assessment	of	autism	diagnosis.	Working	within	the	schools,	this	was	not	feasible.	We	used	a	
convenience	sample	within	the	school	environment,	which	resulted	in	a	male	dominated	sample	
consistent	with	the	reported	male	domination	of	those	who	receive	a	diagnosis	(for	example,	our	
ratio	of	3:1	is	close	to	Baird	et	al.	(2006)	who	report	3.3:1).	The	matching	of	ASD	and	TD	groups	on	
cognitive	ability	in	such	a	novel	study	was	also	not	ideal	as	mathematical	ability	level	was	derived	
from	teacher	report	and	not	formal	independent	testing	(again	within	the	classroom	context,	
additional	assessments	were	not	feasible).	With	suboptimal	matching	we	cannot	discount	the	
possibility	that	group	differences	in	metacognitive	ability	were	the	result	of	general	cognitive	
differences	rather	than	diagnostic	group	membership	per	se.	Independent	assessments	of	both	
autism	diagnosis	and	mathematical	abilities	would	enable	a	more	fine-grained	analysis	which	would	
be	useful	additions	to	future	research.	However,	when	examining	the	relationship	between	
metacognition	and	mathematics	performance,	the	present	study’s	focus	upon	being	context-specific	
to	the	classroom	may	prove	crucial.		
To	conclude,	the	present	study	reports	a	novel	investigation	of	the	impact	of	metacognitive	
support	on	autistic	children’s	mathematics	performance	–	the	results	of	which	have	the	potential	to	
make	a	significant	impact	on	autism	education.	It	is	now	widely	recognised	that	there	is	a	vital	need	
for	evidence-based	guidance	to	enable	improvements	in	educational	provision	for	pupils	with	ASD	
(e.g.,	Charman,	et	al.,	2011;	Keen	et	al.,	2016;	Wilkinson	&	Twist,	2010).	An	existing	body	of	research	
indicates	a	metacognitive	deficit	in	ASD,	coupled	with	underachievement	in	mathematics	that	is	in	
disaccord	with	intellectual	ability.	The	present	findings	add	to	this	and	indicate	that	support	for	
metacognitive	assessments	of	accuracy	and	post-test	intention	monitoring	may	be	particularly	
crucial	targets	for	supporting	learners	with	ASD	in	mathematics,	with	the	potential	to	remove	widely	
reported	under	achievement	in	mathematics.	 	
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